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INTRODUCTION 
 
On June 26, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court in the 5-4 decision, 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 1  held that the U.S. Constitution—specifically the 
Fourteenth Amendment—requires a State to provide a marriage license 
between two people of the same sex and to also recognize a marriage 
between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully 
licensed and performed out-of-State.2   Twitter registered more than 3.5 
million tweets within an hour of the announcement, millions of Facebook 																																																								
* Professor of Law, University of New Hampshire School of Law and 
Faculty Fellow at the Warren B. Rudman Center for Justice, Leadership and 
Public Policy.  The author would like to thank all the contributors to the 
ImmigrationProfBlog online symposium on Kerry v. Din for their unique 
and thoughtful perspectives on this Supreme Court decision. 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2015/06/symposium-on-
kerry-v-din-.html. 
1 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
2 Id. at 2607–08. 
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profiles were backlit with rainbows,3 and the Niagara Falls were lit with the 
colors of the rainbow. This historic civil rights struggle for gay rights and 
equality under the law that culminated in the Obergefell v. Hodges decision 
is worthy of such celebration.  
In this landmark decision, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, 
discussed the reasons and traditions on why marriage is a fundamental right 
protected by the U.S. Constitution and then went on to explain how these 
premises apply to same sex marriage.  First, he explained that choosing 
one’s spouse is inherent to individual liberty, which is why the court in 
Loving v. Virginia struck down bans on interracial marriage.  Second, the 
right to marry is fundamental because it supports a committed union 
between two individuals like no other. Third, protecting the right to marry 
safeguards children and families and “is a central part of the liberty 
protected by the Due Process Clause.”4 Fourth, “marriage is a keystone of 
our social order.”5   In sum, marriage provides individuals the institutional 
and legal capacity to affect “the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, 
sacrifice and family.”6 
Yet, for Fauzia Din, a U.S. citizen and refugee who fled Afghanistan 
to avoid persecution, the promise of marriage remains illusory.  On June 15, 
2015, the U.S. Supreme Court in a plurality opinion7 in Kerry v. Din,8 
upheld the U.S. State Department’s decision to deny her husband, Kanishka 
Berashk, a visa to enter the U.S. and reunite with his wife for “terrorism 
related grounds.”9 The government provided no further explanation about 																																																								
3 Caitlin Dewey, More than 26 million people have changed their Facebook 
picture to a rainbow flag. Here’s why that matters, WASH. POST (June 29, 
2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
intersect/wp/2015/06/29/more-than-26-million-people-have-changed-their-
facebook-picture-to-a-rainbow-flag-heres-why-that-matters/?tid=sm_fb.  
4 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail 434 U.S. 374, 
384 (1974))). 
5 Id. at 2601.  
6 Id. at 2608. 
7 There is no majority opinion in Kerry v. Din. Justice Scalia delivered the 
opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas. Justice 
Kennedy wrote a concurrence joined by Justice Alito.  
8 Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015).  
9 The U.S. State Department in a letter informed Berashak his visa had been 
denied pursuant to INA § 212(a) and that there “no possibility of waiver of 
this ineligibility.” Brief for Respondent at 8, Kerry v. Din, 576135 S. Ct. 
2128 (2015) (No. 13-1402) (2015 WL 179409 at *8 ). 
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why they viewed her husband as a national security threat.  He was payroll 
clerk for the Afghan Ministry of Social Welfare, which was part of the 
national government that at one time, was controlled by the Taliban.  
However, his occupation was not stated as a reason the consular officer in 
Pakistan ultimately denied him a visa to enter the United States.10 Ms. Din 
requested an explanation by the government on the reasons for why her 
husband was refused a visa.  The government’s decision was an 
individualized determination because it required “the application of a legal 
rule to particular facts.” 11  Individualized agency determinations usually 
trigger procedural due process requirements, which include a notice of 
adverse action, an opportunity to present evidence and arguments before a 
neutral decision maker, and a written decision explaining the reasons for the 
outcome.12  
The U.S. State Department refused to grant Ms. Din’s request for 
review and the U.S. Supreme Court declined to recognize any protected 
liberty interest for the couple to live in matrimony in United States; and 
therefore procedural due process requirements were not triggered.13  As of 
today, Ms. Din and her husband’s marriage is in name only, as Ms. Din 
remains in this country with her mother and sister, while her husband 
remains in Afghanistan.  
This article contributes to the discourse14 about how rights for non-
citizens to be reunited with U.S. citizen family members, are devoid of any 																																																								
10 Brief of Amici Curiae Former Consular Officers in Support of 
Respondent at 27, Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) (No 13-1402) (2015 
WL 294670 at *27).   
11 Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2144 (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
12 Id. at 2147 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.  
507, 533 (2004) (plurality opinion)); see also Henry Friendly, Some Kind of 
Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1278–81  (1975) (compiling a list of 
enumerating factors that have been considered to be elements of a fair 
hearing). 
13 Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2133–36. 
14 See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the 
Constitution, 7 CONST. COMMENTARY 9 (1990) (suggesting that current 
constitutional norms defining federal immigration power are shaped by 
citizenship and alienage); see also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law 
After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and 
Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990) (examining immigration 
law as it relates to the symbiotic relationship between statutory 
interpretation and constitutional law).  
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constitutional guarantees, either substantively or procedurally. By 
contrasting the Court’s reasoning in the cases Obergefell v. Hodges and 
Kerry v. Din, this article demonstrates while the Court’s treatment of same 
sex intimate relationships has evolved over time to expand constitutional 
guarantees for these individuals, the Court’s thinking regarding the 
absolute, unreviewable power of the executive to decide who may enter the 
U.S., even to reunite with a U.S. citizen spouse, has remained harshly 
stagnant.  In both Obergefell and Din, the individuals were arguing their 
right to marry and their right to choose where to reside in marriage were 
being obstructed by unlawful government actions that violated due process 
guarantees of the Constitution.  Further, both parties sought similar 
remedies from the Court, which was governmental recognition of their 
martial union and the practical ability to effectuate such a union. The Court 
in Obergefell held that the right to marry someone of the same sex is not a 
question to be left to the political branches of our government, but a 
constitutionally justiciable one.  Yet, the Court in Din deflected the 
constitutional due process claims by relying on its plenary power doctrine 
jurisprudence which “has long held that an alien seeking initial admission to 
the United States . . . has no constitutional rights . . . for the power to admit 
or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative.”15  First, this article explores 
some of the mechanical differences in these two cases by discussing the 
legal theories of the cases.  Second, the article argues that while there are 
certainly technical distinctions, the more satisfying explanation for the 
outcomes in these cases is that immigrant rights, unlike race, personal 
reproductive choices and sexual orientation, has yet to find purchase with 
the Court.  Ultimately, this article concludes that non-citizens rights still 
persist squarely outside the “rights-oriented jurisprudence” of the Court and 
remain ensconced in the political branches’ unreviewable prerogative to 
decide whom to exclude from the United States.16  
 
I. ALL MARRIAGES ARE NOT THE SAME 
 
The Court had the power to wield the same result on both these 
cases—to affirm the right to live with the person of one’s choosing in the 
State of one’s choice—and yet, the Court decided that same sex marriage 
was constitutionally protected substantive right; whereas, the government’s 
decision to deny a U.S. citizen and her immigrant spouse the opportunity to 
reunite and live together in marriage was unreviewable by a court.  This 																																																								
15 Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982).  
16 Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 11–12.  
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section discusses some legal distinctions and factual differences in these 
two cases.  
Procedurally and substantively, these cases diverge.  In Obergefell, 
the petitioners successfully argued that they had constitutionally protected 
substantive due process right—the right to marry someone of the same 
sex—that was being trampled.  They petitioned the Court to intervene and 
affirmatively protect their fundamental right. Whereas, in Kerry v. Din, Ms. 
Din was attempting to assert a procedural due process right, access to 
information about the reasons the U.S government was denying her husband 
entry into the United States. Attempting to distinguish her case from a line 
of immigration cases, where the U.S. Supreme repeatedly affirmed the 
power of the sovereign to exclude non-citizens and affirmed its 
proclamation that “[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is 
due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned,”17 Ms. Din argued 
it was her, not her husband’s, liberty interest that was implicated by the 
government unsupported decision to deny her husband a visa to reunite with 
her in the United States.   
Ms. Din was in a “traditional” marriage.18 She was not challenging 
the state or federal definition of marriage; she was not challenging the 
discretionary authority bestowed by Congress to the executive to decide 
who may enter the United States; she was simply challenging the opaque 
decision making process void of any opportunity to confront and cross 
examine witnesses, submit evidence on her husband’s behalf and refute the 
government’s allegations. Ms. Din’s did not ask the Court to require the 
government to admit her husband; she only requested that the Court to 
require the government provide a basis for their denial. While the right 
asserted by Din is much more modest than Obergefell’s, the Court refused 
to extend any constitutional protection to a U.S. citizen’s claim to be 
reunited with a non-citizen spouse. In sum, “the liberty interest that Ms. Din 
[sought] to protect consists of her freedom to live together with her husband 
																																																								
17 United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950). 
18 A marriage as Justice Roberts notes in his Obergefell dissent was defined 
by Noah Webster in his first American dictionary as “’the legal union of a 
man and a woman for life,’ which severed the purposes of ‘preventing the 
promiscuous intercourse of the sexes,  . . .promoting domestic felicity, and . 
. .securing the maintenance and education of children.’” Obergefell, 135 S. 
Ct. at 2613 (Roberts, C.J. dissenting) (citing 1 An American Dictionary of 
the English Language (1828)). 
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in the United States. She [sought] procedural, not substantive, protection 
for this freedom.”19 
Another distinction between these cases is the type of permission or 
legal recognition each individual sought from the government. In 
Obergefell, the petitioners argued that they had a constitutional right to (1) 
marry the partner of their choice and have that marriage legally recognized 
by the state; and (2) to have a valid same-sex marriage that was performed 
in one state to be recognized as a valid marriage in another state.  The Court 
had to decide if it could review a state’s decision to not issue licenses or 
recognize licenses issued in other states to same sex couples.  In other 
words, do individuals have a constitutionally, judicially enforceable right to 
have their relationship recognized and sanctioned by the issuance of a 
license?  In Obergefell, the Court held that marriage licenses for same sex 
marriage were constitutionally required as a matter of equal protection and 
due process; that states are compelled to recognize same-sex marriages 
licensed by other states, and to issue licenses as well; and states cannot 
through legislation define marriage to only include a union between a man 
and a woman.  
In Kerry v. Din, Ms. Din was challenging the government’s refusal 
to issue her husband an entry visa to join Ms. Din in the United States. In 
this case, the U.S. government did not challenge the validity or legality of 
Ms. Din’s marriage.  In fact, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service 
acknowledged her husband’s prima facie eligible benefit when it approved 
the form I-130.20  The government in its brief to the Court conceded that 
Ms. Din does have “a deeply rooted liberty interest, protected by the Due 
Process Clause, in ‘rights to martial privacy and to marry and raise a 
family.’”21  However, the government argued that these due process rights 
“are not implicated here”22 because denying Ms. Din’s husband a visa did 
not nullify the marriage or deprive Ms. Din of the legal benefits it created.23  
Rather the government decided as a matter of discretion,24 not to allow an 
individual to enter its border.  																																																								
19 Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2142 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (emphasis in the original).  
20 Brief for Respondent at 7, Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) (No. 13-
1402) (2015 WL 179409 at *7). 
21 Brief for the Petitioners at 22, Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) (No. 
13-1402) (2015 WL 6706838 at *22).  
22 Id. at 22–23. 
23 Id.  
24 In this particular case there is even a question if true consular officer 
discretion was exercised. Evidence suggests that the consular officer who 	
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Still, the idea that the Court arrived at different outcomes for these 
married couples based on a formalistic distinction between the “right to 
marry” and “right to live together in matrimony” is unsatisfying for two 
reasons.  First, the crux of James Obergefell’s claim was that he wanted to 
live in a marriage with his husband John Oliver in Ohio, their permanent 
residence, not in Maryland where their marriage was performed and 
licensed.  They could have chosen to move to Maryland and set up 
residence in Maryland where there marriage was recognized, but instead 
they insisted that Ohio was constitutionally required to recognize their 
marriage and permit them to live as a married couple with all the rights that 
flow from a legally recognized marriage including being listed as the 
surviving spouse on a death certificate. The Court agreed opining that 
allowing one state to refuse to recognize a marriage license issued by 
another state “would maintain and promote instability and uncertainty.”25 
Second, the Supreme Court has recognized that there is a fundamental right 
to keep families together and that right includes an extended family.26  For 
example, in Moore v. East Cleveland27, the Supreme Court invalided a city 
ordinance that limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single 
family because the narrow definition of family violated due process.  The 
ordinance defined family as an individual, a husband and wife and their 
unmarried children. Ms. Inez Moore was convicted of a criminal offense, 
served five days in jail and ordered to pay a fine because she was living her 
in East Cleveland home with her son and two grandsons, who were first 
cousins, not brothers.28  The Court concluded that “[w]hether or not such a 																																																																																																																																												
interviewed Ms. Din’s husband was poised to grant the visa but the 
automated background check ultimately resulted in a denial.  The 
background check is administered through the Consular Consolidated 
Database (CCD), which contains more than 143 million visa application 
records and data from the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS). 
CLASS contains more than 42.5 million records, including 27 million 
persons who are ineligible for visas. Much of the data comes from several 
federal agencies including the FBI, DHS, DEA and other intelligence 
agencies. Furthermore the FBI Inspector General raised concerns about the 
integrity of the information stored in the database. See Brief of Amici Curie 
Former Consular Officers in Support of Respondent at 11–13, Kerry v. Din, 
135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) (No 13-1402).   
25 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607. 
26 Moore v. City of Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504–06 (1977). 
27 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
28 Id. at 496–97. 
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household is established because of personal tragedy, the choice of relatives 
in this degree of kinship to live together may not lightly be denied by the 
State. . . .[T]he Constitution prevents East Cleveland from standardizing its 
children and its adults by forcing all to live in certain narrowly defined 
family patterns.”29 Thus Moore affirmed that the government is prevented 
from arbitrarily restricting the right of a family to live together, including 
the associational right of a husband and wife to live together.30  
Juxtaposed with the Court’s concern about comity between state 
marriage license policies, is the Court’s apathy in Kerry v. Din the Court for 
how their holding would practically impede the ability for Fauzia Din and 
her husband to reside together in marriage. The U.S. government 
successfully argued that its decision to deny Berashk’s visa did not prohibit 
Ms. Din and her husband from living together in marriage; they were just 
not allowing them to live together in the United States.  The Court did not 
find it legally significant that Ms. Din fled Afghanistan for fear of 
persecution and was granted refugee status prior to becoming a U.S. citizen; 
or that for her to return and live in Afghanistan might pose threat to her life; 
or that she rebuilt her life in this country and swore allegiance to the United 
States when she became a naturalized citizen; or that neither she nor her 
husband had no legal right to reside in any other countries.  For the Court, 
the theoretical possibility that this married couple could live in matrimony 
elsewhere did not threaten their fundamental right to marry.  This 
proposition stands in stark contrast to the Court’s position in Obergefell that 
held the married couple should not have to move from on state to in order to 
live together in marriage.  
 
II. PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS: US VERSUS THEM 
 
Why was the Court less concerned with protecting Din’s marital 
relationship than Obergefell’s, even though her marriage was a “traditional” 
one? Why did the Court insist Obergefell’s marriage license should be 
portable and recognized by other jurisdictions, but fail to recognize any 
right for Din to choose where to live in marriage?  I would argue the biggest 
difference in the Court’s willingness to extend constitutional protections to 
Fauzia Din is that she is married to a non-citizen. Over time, with concerted 
efforts in raising public opinion and litigating through the courts, same sex 
couples are now one of us.  The Court’s decision in Obergefell was the 
culmination of series of Supreme Court decisions over the last three decades 																																																								
29 Id. at 505–06.  
30 Id. at 510–11.  
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regarding the legal status of homosexuals.  In Bowers v. Hardwick,31 the 
Court upheld the constitutionality of a Georgia statute that criminalized 
sodomy. Ten years later, the Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans,32 struck 
down an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that would have 
prohibited any city, town, or county from taking any action including 
judicial action to recognize homosexuals as a protected class, as an 
unconstitutional violation of the equal protection clause. In 2003, the 
Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas33  overturned Bowers v. Hardwick 
holding that laws that make same sex intimacy a crime “demea[n] the lives 
of homosexual persons.”34 As recent as 2013 the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Windsor 35  invalidated the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) 
because barred the Federal Government from recognizing same sex 
marriages as valid even when they were lawful in the States they licensed. 
Like the Court’s evolving jurisprudence regarding racial equality,36 
the full recognition of all rights for homosexuals, materialized with 
incremental decisions by the Court regarding gay rights.  Indeed, Justice 
Kennedy writing for the majority in Obergefell noted, “[t]he right to marry 
is fundamental as a matter of history and tradition, but rights come not from 
ancient sources alone.  They rise, too, from a better informed understanding 
of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent in our 																																																								
31 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
32 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
33 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
34 Id. at 575. 
35 113 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
36 See e.g., Dredd Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (holding that slaves 
are not citizens in the Constitution and therefore they cannot avail 
themselves of any rights and privileges found in the Constitution), 
superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; 
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (holding a state statute that 
limited jury service to white males who are twenty-one or older and citizens 
of West Virginia was unconstitutional because it expressly “singled out” 
and disadvantaged blacks); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) 
(upholding a Louisiana law that required railway passenger cars to have 
separate but equal accommodation for “the white and colored races”), 
abrogated by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding 
that separate education facilities are “inherently unequal” and as such are 
unconstitutional); Virginia v. Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating a 
state statute that made it a crime for persons of different races to marry 
because it was unconstitutional). 
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own era.”37 Justice Kennedy further illuminates the relationship between 
Court’s evolving jurisprudence and public sentiment. “Indeed, in 
interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has recognized the new 
insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality within 
our most fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and 
unchallenged.”38  
Undeniably, the outcome, the plurality opinion, as well as the 
concurrence, in Kerry v. Din is in line with the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on the plenary power doctrine, which has refused to overturn 
or invalidate immigration statutes, holding that immigration is a matter 
“vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard 
to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance 
of . . . government . . . exclusively entrusted to the political branches of 
government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or 
interference.”39  The Court has further held that that immigration, and the 
right to regulate which individuals are allowed to enter the United States, is 
a power of the sovereign, thus signaling that the President has the authority 
to regulate entry into the United States.40 Moreover the Court has stated, 
“over no other area is the legislative power more ‘complete’ than 
immigration.”41 It is Congress that enacts laws determining who can enter 
the United States, under what conditions, and for how long.42 Congress also 
establishes who can be removed from the United States based on acts they 
commit after entry. 43  Ultimately the outcome of the Din decision is to 
confirm the status quo: “aliens seeking admission [can]not challenge 
immigration law on explicitly constitutional grounds.”44   
																																																								
37 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.  
38 Id. at 2603. 
 39 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588–89 (1952). 
 40 Id. at 586–88 (1952) (finding a noncitizen remaining in the United States 
is a “matter of permission and tolerance;” and not a right).  
41 See Adam Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration 
Law, 119 YALE L. J. 458, 461 (2009) (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 
U.S. 753, 766 (1972)).  
42 See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION 
AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 12–24 (5th ed. 2009). 
 43 See DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 5–6 (2007) (discussing two basic types of deportation 
laws: “extended border control” and “post-entry social control”). 
44 Motomura, supra note 14, at 571.  
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The plurality and concurrence in Kerry v. Din, refused to 
substantively review the executive branch’s decision to exclude an 
individual from entry without notice or an opportunity for rebuttal. Unlike 
Obergefell whose legal claim was strategically grounded in the Court’s 
evolving understanding as to the rights of individuals in same sex 
relationships, the Court’s jurisprudence regarding the availability of due 
process for non-citizens or their spouses challenging the decision to bar 
admission remains painfully stationary. The plurality argued that Ms. Din 
had no constitutional right that merited judicial review.  Din attempted 
distinguish her cases from prior cases regarding the government’s power to 
exclude by asserting that she as a U.S. citizen had a constitutional right to 
know the specific reasons her husband was denied entry into the United 
States when the validity of the marriage itself was not at issue. Scalia is not 
persuaded and finds that there is no constitutional right to challenge a 
sovereign’s decision on who to exclude even if that impacts a U.S. citizen. 
Whereas, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, did not go as far to say that Ms. 
Din had no liberty interest in her marriage, but rather the reason the 
government provided for denying her husband’s visa was sufficient to 
satisfy due process.45  In sum, the executive branch continues to possess 
absolute and unreviewable authority to exclude individuals at the border 
based on alleged national security grounds.46   
The outcome and reasoning provided by the plurality and 
concurrence in Din is reminiscent of Court’s decision over fifty years ago in 
Knauff v. Shaughnessy. 47   In Knauff, the Supreme Court held that the 
government’s decision to exclude Ellen Knauff, for national security 
reasons without a hearing was constitutionally permissible.48  Ellen Knauff 
was born in Germany in 1915, and then moved to Czechoslovakia.49   In 
1939 she fled to England as a refugee.  During, World War II, Ms. Knauff 
served as a flight sergeant with the Royal Air Force in England and 
subsequently as a civilian employee of the U.S. Army in Germany.  It was 
in Germany she met and married Kurt Knauff an Army veteran and fellow 
civilian Army employee.50  After their marriage in Germany, she travelled 
to the United States to join her husband and apply for U.S. citizenship.  
When she arrived on August 14, 1948 she was immediately excluded from 																																																								
45 Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2139. 
46 See Id. at 2140.  
47 338 U.S. 537 (1950). 
48 Id. at 544.  
49 Id. at 539. 
50 Id. 
	88                   UTAH LAW REVIEW ONLAW                                     [NO.4 
entry and detained at Ellis Island.51  Two months later the Attorney General 
ruled without a hearing the Knauff would not be allowed to enter the United 
States because “her admission would be prejudicial to the interests of the 
United States.” 52  She filed a habeas corpus petition challenging the 
Department of Justice’s decision to deny her entry.  Both the federal district 
court and the court of appeals denied her habeas petition.  The Supreme 
Court affirmed the lower courts’ decisions ruling that the Attorney General 
had the power to exclude Knauff without any hearing if the decision to 
exclude was for national security reasons.53  “The rule of Knauff is that the 
government has absolute power to exclude.  When an official claims that 
the exclusion concerns the country’s national security, no court may 
examine the government’s claim.”54   
  
																																																								
51 Id.  
52 Id. at 539-40. 
53 Id. at 544. 
54 Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons 
from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PENN. L. REV. 933, 
957 (1995). 
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CONCLUSION 
 
While there is much to celebrate in the U.S. Supreme evolving 
jurisprudence to recognize constitutional guarantee to marry the person of 
one’s choosing, I would argue the Court still has failed to protect marriage 
where one party is a non-citizen. Ultimately, while family unity, is a central 
value that informs immigration laws and policies,55 familial relationships do 
not alter the political nature of U.S. immigration control policies or the 
Court’s continual unwillingness to scrutinize decisions made by the political 
branches of government. The decision in Kerry v. Din simply buttresses the 
unchecked power of the executive to arbitrarily exclude and reaffirms that 
this absolute, non-reviewable power to decide who is member of the 
community of the United States and who is excluded, is an inherent power 
of a sovereign nation.56 Until love wins for all, including non-citizens, the 
promise of our democracy—equality and due process under the law—
remain unrealized. 
 
 
																																																								
55 H. Rep. No. 82-1365, at 29 (1952). 
56 Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 9–10.  Aleinikoff argues that the “current 
constitutional norms defining federal immigration power are shaped by a 
membership model of citizenship and alienage. The Constitution is 
understood as recognizing or establishing a ‘national community,’ and one 
belongs to that community by being a citizen.” 
